On June 20–22, 2025, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), the China Strategic Focus Group at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and the University of Virginia’s National Security Data and Policy Institute (NSDPI) convened the 2025 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Conference at the University of Virginia. The conference brought together leading specialists on the PLA from academia, government, military, and policy research organizations from the United States and allied and partner governments.
The 2025 PLA Conference was titled “More Power (for them), More Problems (for us): How Comprehensive National Power is Reshaping the PLA.” The conference examined how the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) assessment of its comprehensive national power (CNP) is impacting roles and missions for the PLA. In particular, the conference examined cross-cutting themes such as risk-aversion versus risk-tolerance, “strategic space” and “strategic layout,” and an evolving conception of the spectrum of conflict and escalation ladder, among other topics.
The first panel, “Assessing Self-Assessments: CNP and the Role of the PLA,” framed the conference by situating the PLA’s increasingly prominent role in China’s external behaviors within an evolving PRC self-assessment of its CNP relative to the United States and other actors in the Indo-Pacific region. The first paper examined how since 2010, the CCP has assessed that China is the second most powerful country in the world as measured by CNP, leading to expanded missions and responsibilities for the PLA. The second paper assessed the relationship between risk, power, and decision-making to understand how CCP thinkers manage the interaction of these three factors at the national strategy, military strategy, campaign/operational, and tactical levels. The third paper considers how the CCP’s evolving understanding of its “strategic space” shapes PLA missions and the implications for China’s vision for a new era of influence in both tangible and intangible domains.
The second panel, “A Vision for Victory: PLA Theories of Victory Across the Spectrum of Conflict,” examined how China’s views on the spectrum of conflict are evolving by assessing traditional criteria for tactical, operational, and strategic success by defining “victory” in discrete phases of conflict. The first paper revisits traditional understandings of CCP views of the spectrum of conflict and finds that strategists in China see modern warfare as a contest of CNP waged through all-domain, system-based model of conflict. The second paper argues that as China expands its CNP, the PLA is increasingly comfortable in a state of military friction and sustained levels of low-level near crisis to achieve its objectives by changing the status quo in its favor through coercive activity. The third paper offers insight into when, how, and why China escalates or sustains periods of military confrontation to leverage military tools to pursue political objectives, despite these confrontations carrying potential for escalation. The fourth paper examines Chinese views of armed conflict to understand Beijing’s perception of escalatory dynamics, operations, and decision-making frameworks across the spectrum of conflict.
The third panel, “Learning by Doing: Use of Force Across the Spectrum of Conflict,” assessed select instances of PLA operations short of full-spectrum combat operations to understand escalatory potential in each case and how the conditions of each case inform the PLA’s operational activities. This panel also examined if and how the PLA’s enhanced nuclear capabilities, changing force posture, and apparent shifting doctrine and employment approaches are shaping nuclear deterrence, messaging, and threats across the spectrum of conflict short of war. The first paper argues that the peacetime employment of military force around Taiwan following then- Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island is characterized as consistent with Chinese concepts of military struggle and coercion. The second paper examined the PLA’s role in the crises at the disputed Sino-Indian border region and assessed the likelihood of escalation. The third paper examined how the PLA is using nuclear deterrence, bolstered by a growing nuclear arsenal and evolving strategic force posture.
The 2025 conference also featured breakout groups on related topics, including PLA challenges to Taiwan’s whole-of-society resilience efforts, PLA theories of victory in a Taiwan Strait crisis, China’s quest for military supremacy, Chinese views and theories for deterrence and compellence, and the application of emerging technology in the PLA. The conference concluded with a synthesis discussion that solicited questions, answers, and perspectives from the audience to synthesize previous conversations and identify unanswered questions, disagreements, and new insights to inform collective thinking on the future of the PLA.